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Worsening crime and violence in Latin America

Aug 9, 2022
4 min read

Two particularly significant events took place on July 30: the World Day Against Trafficking in Persons and the sixth anniversary of the International Police Association’s Colombian section.


Written by Brigadier General (Ret.) Juan Carlos Buitrago Arias | August 2022



Two particularly significant events took place on July 30: the World Day Against Trafficking in Persons and the sixth anniversary of the International Police Association’s Colombian section. Present in 65 countries, the IPA is an important cooperation mechanism, a United Nations partner and a platform with enormous potential for integration, globalization, training and strengthening police institutions. It provided a valuable opportunity to share perspectives with police institutions from the Americas and Europe on organized crime and violence affecting the region, as well as the challenges of cooperation.


Nearly 500,000 people worldwide die violently each year. Of these, 36%—approximately 135,000—are in Latin America, and 34% are concentrated in seven countries: Jamaica, Venezuela, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Belize and Mexico. The main concern is that violent homicide in the region is increasingly associated with organized crime and violence, with drug trafficking remaining the cornerstone. In the United States alone, 100,000 people died from fentanyl overdoses last year. This drug is between 50 and 100 times more powerful than heroin and morphine and is now a principal focus of efforts to combat illegal trafficking. According to the Global Organized Crime Index, human trafficking, cannabis trafficking, arms trafficking, migrant smuggling, cocaine trafficking and synthetic-drug trafficking were the six fastest-growing criminal markets in Latin America over the past year. More than 100 undocumented migrants have died this year trying to cross the Mexico–United States border. Panama has also recorded the kidnapping of more than 23 adolescent girls, forcibly taken from vehicles, schools and homes for sexual exploitation and reportedly for organ-trafficking networks, another highly profitable emerging business.


The challenge grows as these expanding activities become inseparable from money laundering, corruption and cybercrime, making them more profitable, versatile, sophisticated and productive. Mexican cartels continue expanding across Latin America, with active operations in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Chile. Central America is consolidating its role as a strategic hub for illicit trade in goods, drugs, weapons and migrants. The Southern Cone is becoming a platform for smuggling and money laundering through the tri-border area, for exports of Bolivian cocaine linked to the murder of Paraguay’s anti-mafia prosecutor in Barú, and for smuggled cigarettes moving from Paraguay to Aruba, Curaçao, Panama and Colombia.


The illicit markets in goods, weapons, drugs and people draw on the 1,500 tonnes of cocaine produced annually in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, nearly one billion small arms beyond official control, almost 300 million drug users and the US$600 billion generated by illicit trade each year. A striking figure was recently disclosed at the Concordia Forum in Miami: eight billion illicit cigarettes transit Panama annually, with transactions largely linked to smuggling, counterfeiting, money laundering and tax fraud.


Organized crime and violence reinforce each other, exploiting the fragility and instability of Latin America’s public institutions. This weakness is clearly reflected in porous, poorly controlled land and maritime borders. The challenge is especially significant because 80% of world trade travels by sea. In 2021 alone, 11 billion containers were moved. Authorities must facilitate foreign trade, supported by mechanisms such as Authorized Economic Operators, the United Nations’ Container Control Programme, the Airport Communication Programme, the Global Maritime Crime Programme and the European Union’s EL PAcCTO programme. Yet ports remain inadequately equipped, automation is weak and corruption is endemic—advantages criminal networks skillfully exploit.


The 2021 Global Peace Index showed a marked deterioration in violence in seven Latin American countries. Haiti, ranked 114th and affected by its president’s assassination, Mexico, ranked 137th, and Venezuela, ranked 148th, were among the region’s worst affected, while Costa Rica and Uruguay stood out for improvement. Of the 163 countries assessed by the United Nations, 126 experienced deterioration linked to violent social protest, representing a 49% increase. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia were the most affected regions, followed by Latin America, where Colombia, Peru and Chile worsened.


Finally, cybercrime costs the world US$20 trillion. Cyberattacks rose by 65% in 2021 and affected 51% of businesses. Illicit e-commerce adds to this problem, accounting for 3.3% of the US$26 trillion traded annually, with counterfeiting, adulteration, tax fraud and smuggling among the most common practices. According to the World Health Organization, 50% of medicines available through digital networks are counterfeit. ANDI’s anti-counterfeiting project reiterated this in its first report, highlighting organized crime’s reach into illegal e-commerce. For Latin America, the problem is that only seven of 32 countries have a public policy for protection against cybercrime; only five have joined the Budapest Convention, which brings states together to combat crime in cyberspace; and 12 have a national strategy. Colombia is among the region’s most advanced countries.


The incoming government’s decision to move Colombia’s National Police to a new ministry must reaffirm the institution’s leadership in Latin America, widely recognized by Ameripol, Europol and INTERPOL. It must continue strengthening operational, intelligence and criminal-investigation capabilities to contain transnational organized crime. It is also time to explore creating a border force to take decisive control of territories most vulnerable to crime. Disbanding illegal armed groups does not eliminate criminal revenue streams: these will continue fueling the endless cycle of violence and crime.


LPNSN: The Clan del Golfo does not care whether citizens mobilize to condemn the killing of the nation’s police officers. Its indifference and treachery require the state to continue deploying its full capabilities to confront and bring the group under control.




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