U.S. Intervention and Political Transition in Venezuela: Implications for Border Security

Venezuelan Political Scenario and Cross-Border Risks

On January 3, United States special forces carried out a raid in Caracas, Venezuela, with the aim of capturing the leader of the Venezuelan regime, Nicolás Maduro, and putting him on trial for alleged links to drug trafficking. At the same time, the U.S. government expressed its willingness to intervene in the country while a democratic transition process unfolds.

These events have generated high uncertainty about Venezuela's political future and, in particular, about the evolution of its relations with Colombia, with which it shares one of its longest and most strategic borders. This border area has historically been a favorable space for the operation of criminal networks dedicated to obtaining illicit rents linked to smuggling, illegal mining and drug trafficking. Although the eventual departure of Nicolás Maduro from power and a possible U.S. intervention could, in the long term, contribute to improved security conditions, substantive changes are unlikely in the short and medium term. This is due both to the persistent political instability that will characterize the country during the transition process and to the entrenchment and adaptability of these criminal networks.

Territorial Control and Operation of Transnational Criminal Networks in Border Areas

The border between Venezuela and Colombia is one of the longest in Latin America and has historically been marked by the strong presence of criminal structures seeking to control the informal crossings (trochas) and clandestine routes used for logistics, recruitment and illegal trade dynamics. In this context, the Colombian organization National Liberation Army (ELN) stands out, having consolidated itself in Venezuelan territory as a paramilitary-type force serving interests aligned with the regime, particularly since its entry into the country during the government of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and its subsequent coordination with political and military actors associated with Chavismo (Insight Crime, 2026). Since then, the ELN has steadily expanded its presence in Venezuela and has established itself as a key actor in the administration and protection of various illicit rents.

In recent years, the ELN has managed to structure smuggling dynamics for multiple goods, taking advantage of price asymmetries between the two countries and operating outside health and customs controls. It has also shown a remarkable capacity to adapt to changes in border policy. An example was seen after the official reopening of the border on September 26, 2022 —closed since 2019 after the attempt to bring in humanitarian aid— when a reduction in illegal economies was expected. Contrary to these expectations, criminal networks organized themselves and even managed to increase their profits by extorting truckers, guaranteeing passage through informal crossings, camouflaging goods and other illicit activities (Insight Crime, 2024).

The consolidation of the ELN in Venezuela shows that its power and operational capacity predate the government of Nicolás Maduro and are deeply rooted in Chavista structures with close ties to the military establishment. According to La Silla Vacía (2026), these relationships have been strengthened for years through the granting of perks aimed at securing the armed forces' loyalty to the regime. Although the United States has expressed its intention to intervene in the country, these political and military structures remain present in Venezuelan territory and maintain a high degree of cohesion and entrenchment, which introduces a high level of uncertainty regarding their reaction to possible external decisions or transition processes. In this context, it is highly likely that the dynamics of illegal trade and criminal control on the Colombian-Venezuelan border will continue, at least in the short and medium term.

Commercial Security on the Border: An Adverse Operating Environment

It is highly likely that illicit trade dynamics on the Colombian-Venezuelan border will continue, at least in the short and medium term, at magnitudes and patterns similar to those recorded before Nicolás Maduro's departure from power. In this context, companies —especially those engaged in or linked to land transport in border areas— will remain exposed to high operational risks, including extortion, logistics disruptions and restrictions on the safe transit of goods. Faced with a high-risk outlook, companies should adopt preventive strategies based on continuous analysis of the environment, logistics diversification and robust compliance mechanisms to protect their operations and reputation.

In addition, the persistent sale of smuggled products in Venezuela and Colombia —many of which do not meet health or regulatory controls— can negatively affect the reputation of formal brands, distort competition and prices, and expose consumers to goods of uncertain quality and safety, affecting both demand for legal products and market trust.

We are your allies against illicit trade. We support your company in identifying and managing the risks arising from political changes and instability scenarios that affect trade dynamics in the region.

References

Insight Crime. (2024). El contrabando se adapta en la frontera colombo-venezolana. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias/contrabando-adapta-reapertura-frontera-colombo-venezolana/

Insight Crime. (2026). ELN es el grupo criminal con presencia en Venezuela. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias-crimen-organizado-venezuela/eln-en-venezuela/

Rodríguez Álvarez, S. (January 3, 2026). Los riesgos para Colombia tras el ataque de EE. UU. en Venezuela. La Silla Vacía. https://www.lasillavacia.com/silla-nacional/los-riesgos-para-colombia-tras-el-ataque-de-ee-uu-en-venezuela/