When the threat comes from within: global supply chains and the illegal trade in bearings

When it comes to illegal trade, the most common image is that of a container crossing a border without being declared. But there is a less visible and far more difficult to detect form: one that uses formal channels, presents proper documentation and declares real brands before customs, while the product actually being shipped is a counterfeit. In the global bearings market —those cylindrical components that enable the movement of engines, turbines, vehicles and industrial machinery— this phenomenon has reached a scale that threatens both end-user safety and the competitiveness of legitimate manufacturers. The World Bearing Association estimates that roughly 2.5% of the global bearings market is counterfeit (SKF Group, 2024), a percentage that in absolute terms represents hundreds of millions of dollars per year and that, in countries with limited customs enforcement capacity, is likely to be considerably higher.

What makes this type of illegal trade particularly complex is that, in many cases, the root of the problem lies within the supply chain itself. It is not always an external actor copying a product: sometimes it is the very same suppliers —or their intermediaries in another country— who divert original goods into unauthorized channels, or who manufacture lower-quality versions using the same production lines. In the bearings industry, this pattern is widely documented. Plants located in countries with high manufacturing capacity produce parts that precisely replicate the external specifications of well-known brands —packaging, engraving, reference codes— but with materials and tolerances that fail to meet the original quality standards. The result is a product that looks legitimate at first glance, that clears customs document checks because it is declared under the correct brand and tariff heading, but that in 39% of cases, according to industry manufacturer estimates, can put the end user's life at risk (Ruge, 2026, as cited in Portafolio, 2026).

Latin America is not on the sidelines of this phenomenon. In May 2026, a joint operation by Colombia's Fiscal and Customs Police (POLFA), the national tax authority (DIAN) and the Attorney General's Office in Bogotá resulted in the seizure of more than 130,000 units of foreign-origin auto parts across four areas of the capital, valued at over two billion Colombian pesos (POLFA, 2026, as cited in Portafolio, 2026). Among the findings were 125,000 bearings stored without any legal documentation supporting their importation. What the operation revealed was not just the sheer size of the illegal inventory, but the route it had followed: product manufactured in Asia, re-exported through intermediate commercial hubs and ultimately brought into Colombia through channels that, on the surface, complied with customs formalities. It is technical smuggling at its most sophisticated: it does not evade customs —it passes right through.

The natural question is how to detect something that, by design, is built to go unnoticed. The answer lies in trade data itself. Every import declaration records the declared value, weight, origin, country of shipment, importer and goods description. When these records are analyzed collectively and unit value benchmarks are constructed by product and brand, anomalies emerge clearly: imports of bearings that declare a premium brand but enter at unit values 30, 50 or even 130 times below the legitimate reference price. Triangulation routes where the country of shipment does not match the country of origin, and the goods pass through free trade zones or transshipment ports before reaching their final destination. Importers with no track record in the sector who suddenly appear with significant volumes of branded product. These signals, invisible when examined record by record, form a clear risk map when processed with data intelligence tools.

Mirror analysis —which cross-references what an exporting country reports having shipped against what the importing country declares having received— adds an additional layer of detection. Gaps between both figures, when they are systematic and sustained over time, serve as indicators of under-declaration, product diversion or value manipulation. This type of analysis, combined with continuous monitoring of import records, makes it possible to anticipate risks rather than react to seizures. Protecting a brand in international trade is no longer just a matter of security seals or point-of-sale verification apps: it requires intelligence on how product moves at the border, who moves it and at what price (SKF Colombia, 2026).

From the Center for Research, Monitoring and Analysis of Illegal Trade (CIMA), Strategos BIP works precisely on that frontier: turning foreign trade data into actionable intelligence for companies that need to protect their supply chains. Because the greatest risk is not always on the outside. Sometimes, the threat comes from within.

References

Portafolio. (2026, May 14). Incautan más de 130.000 autopartes ilegales en Bogotá valoradas en $2.000 millones. Portafolio. https://www.portafolio.co/economia/incautan-mas-de-130-000-autopartes-ilegales-en-bogota

SKF Colombia. (2026, May 20). SKF Authenticate: protegiendo la autenticidad de los rodamientos en Colombia. SKF. https://www.skf.com/co/

SKF Group. (2024). Stop fake bearings: protecting customers and end users. SKF. https://www.skf.com/group/support/stop-fake-bearings